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Of Constituents and Contributors
Richard Briffaultt
INTRODUCTION
In the stirring conclusion to his plurality opinion in
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,' Chief Justice
Roberts pointed to the close connection between campaign
contributions and what he called the "political responsiveness at
the heart of the democratic process." 2 Quoting Edmund Burke's
statement in his famous Speech to the Electors of Bristol that a
representative's judgment should be informed by "the closest
correspondence, and the most unreserved communication with
his constituents," 3 the Chief Justice eloquently declaimed that
"[c]onstituents have the right to support candidates who share
their views and concerns. Representatives are not to follow
constituent orders, but can be expected to be cognizant of and
responsive to those concerns. Such responsiveness is key to the
concept of self-governance."4
The Chief Justice's emphasis on protecting the
representative-constituent relationship was more than a bit
jarring, however, as McCutcheon addressed the desire of an
individual to contribute to candidates in states and
congressional districts in which he was not a constituent. At
issue in McCutcheon were the aggregate contribution limits the
Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") imposes on individual
campaign contributions. FECA caps not only the amount of
money an individual may donate to a specific candidate in an
election-the so-called "base limit"-but also the aggregate
t Joseph P. Chamberlain Professor of Legislation, Columbia University School of
Law.
1 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
2 Id. at 1461.
Id. (quoting THE SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HON. EDMUND BURKE 129-30 (J. Burke
ed. 1867)).
Id. at 1462.
29
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
amount an individual may donate to all federal candidates,
political parties, and political committees that donate to federal
candidates in an election cycle. Under the overall cap, FECA
also specifically limits the aggregate amount an individual may
donate just to federal candidates in that cycle.5 A direct
consequence of the aggregate cap is to limit the number of
candidates a donor may support and, thus, the number of
different election campaigns in which the donor may
participate financially.
In 2012, Shaun McCutcheon, a resident of Alabama, wanted
to contribute $1,776 apiece to candidates for the United States
Senate in Connecticut and Minnesota, and to candidates for the
House of Representatives running in districts in Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Florida (two different districts), Utah,
Washington, and Wisconsin.6 McCutcheon had already made
substantial contributions--one of $5,000, two of $2,500, and the
rest of $1,776-to fifteen other candidates around the country,
including Senate candidates in Ohio and Georgia, and
candidates in different House districts in California (three),
Maryland, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Texas (three), and
Virginia, as well as to candidates in two different congressional
districts in his home state of Alabama.7 As a result, FECA's
aggregate contribution cap barred the additional contributions.
By invalidating the aggregate contribution limits, the
McCutcheon decision permits Shaun McCutcheon and other
individuals with comparable wealth and political commitments
to give to as many candidates in as many different
constituencies as they want. Indeed, the very essence of the
McCutcheon decision is the facilitation of out-of-district and out-
of-state donations. A donor would not have reached the
At the time of the McCutcheon litigation, FECA imposed four distinct aggregate
limits-a limit on the total an individual could give to all federal candidates ($48,000 in
the 2013-14 election cycle); a limit on the total an individual could give to non-candidate
federal political committees ($74,600); a sublimit within the political committee limit on
the total amount that could be donated to state or local party committees and political
action committees (PACs) of $48,600 in 2013-14, and a total limit on all donations to
federal candidates and non-candidate committees, which was $123,200 in 2013-24. Id. at
1442-43. The base limits on individual donations in the 2013-14 election cycle were
$2,600 per candidate ($5,200 for an election cycle consisting of both a primary and a
general election); $32,400 per year to a national party committee; $10,000 per year to a
state or local party committee; and $5,000 to a PAC. Id. at 1442.
6 See Complaint at 11-12, McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 893 F. Supp. 2d
133 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 1:12-cv-01034-JEB).
7 Id. at 10-11.
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aggregate cap on candidate donations without contributing to
candidates outside the donor's own constituency, so by limiting
the number of candidates to whom a donor could give, the law
curbed out-of-district and out-of-state donations. By preserving
the base limits while striking down the aggregate limits,
McCutcheon enables an individual to give much more money-
but not any more money to any one candidate. The donor who
wants to take advantage of McCutcheon has to give to more
candidates (and to political committees and parties that give to
candidates).8 Unless the donor wants to give money to many
more candidates campaigning against each other in the same
electoral contest-which seems unlikely-the donor will give to
more candidates in many different states and districts. By
striking down the aggregate limits, McCutcheon directly
promotes contributions by non-constituents.
The Chief Justice is surely right that campaign
contributions are one way an individual can seek to make
officeholders "responsive" to their concerns. But as Shaun
McCutcheon's donations and intended donations to candidates
seeking to represent more than two dozen different
constituencies demonstrate, constituents and contributors are
not the same people. Making elected representatives more
responsive to McCutcheon's concerns will not make them more
responsive to their constituents. To the contrary, contributors-
particularly non-constituent contributors-may have very
different interests than non-contributor constituents. Increased
responsiveness to contributors may very well be in tension with
responsiveness to constituents.
This article explores some aspects of the distinction between
constituents and contributors and the implications of the
constituent-contributor relationship for campaign finance law
and democratic self-government. Part I provides a brief overview
" Chief Justice Roberts was well aware of this. See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448
("[T]he aggregate limits prohibit an individual from fully contributing to the primary and
general election campaigns of ten or more candidates."). Similarly, during the
McCutcheon oral argument the Chief Justice repeatedly pressed Solicitor General
Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., who was defending the aggregate contribution limits, on the
constitutional problem posed by "limiting how many candidates an individual can
support within the limits that Congress has said don't present any danger of corruption."
Transcript of Oral Argument at 29, McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 134 S. Ct.
1434 (2014) (No. 12-536). See also id. at 28 (asking about preventing the appearance of
corruption "while at the same time allowing an individual to contribute to however many
House candidates he wants to contribute to").
29] 31
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of the role of non-constituent donors in financing contemporary
election campaigns. It finds that non-constituents provide the
bulk of itemized individual contributions-that is, donations of
$200 or more-to candidates for Congress. The data concerning
non-constituent donations in state and local elections is more
anecdotal than systematic, but there is considerable evidence
that non-constituent, particularly out-of-state, money plays a
large part in financing state and local elections too. At all levels
of government, there is a significant disconnect between the
categories of contributor and constituent.
Part II considers the implications of substantial non-
constituent contributions for the American system of
territorially-based representation and democratic self-
government. Given the potential for officeholder responsiveness
to donors celebrated by the Chief Justice, contributors, in effect,
have become another constituency that elected representatives
represent. There may be some value to this, particularly in races
for Congress, where the results of elections in some states or
districts can affect the partisan control of the House of
Representatives or Senate and, thus, have nationwide
implications. Even here, though, non-constituent financing can
have an impact on how representatives represent their actual
constituents. The tension between constituent and contributor
representation is even greater when campaigns are funded by
donors from outside the relevant jurisdiction. That occurs, for
example, when out-of-state residents contribute to candidates
for state office. They belong to a different political community
than the elected representatives and they are not directly
regulated by the laws enacted and enforced by the voters or
representatives of that community. To be sure, with the growing
nationalization and partisanship of elections, outsiders may
have a strong subjective interest in a state or local race in a
distant jurisdiction even if, objectively, they are not governed by
the results.9 But the emergence of a substantial non-constituent
constituency poses a significant challenge to our system of
representation which is based almost entirely on the use of
9 See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077,
1136 (2014); Todd E. Pettys, Campaign Finance, Federalism, and the Case of the Long-
Armed Donor, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 77, 87-88 (2014); James A. Gardner, The
Myth of State Autonomy: Federalism, Political Parties, and the National Colonization of
State Politics, 29 J.L. & POL. 1, 43 (2013).
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territorial constituencies-states, cities, and legislative
districts-for the election of representatives and the processes of
democratic self-government.
With outsider contributions potentially shifting the focus of
elected representatives away from the concerns of their voting
constituency, a handful of jurisdictions-all of them relatively
small states-have sought to reduce the role of outside money in
state and local elections. Part III reviews these campaign
finance measures and the court decisions that have considered
challenges to them. Limits on the contributions a candidate for
state office may accept from outsiders have been generally,
albeit not uniformly, struck down. Such restrictions on outside
contributions are almost certainly unconstitutional, but, as I will
indicate, state and local public financing systems that make
candidate eligibility for public funds contingent on raising a
threshold number of small donations from constituents are a
constitutional and potentially useful means of ameliorating the
impact of outside money by reducing its importance.
Part IV concludes by considering what the Chief Justice's
invocation of constituency and the concept of self-government
says about the state of contemporary campaign finance doctrine.
The Roberts Court has consistently emphasized the speech and
associational dimensions of campaign finance.10 A five-justice
majority of the Court has likened efforts to limit campaign
money to government censorship," and has rejected the
argument that regulation may be used to prevent big money
from distorting the electoral process. 12 In their view,
contributions and spending, even if unequal, play a valuable role
in communicating positions on electoral issues and expressing
support for candidates.13 Only campaign contributions that pose
the danger of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance may be
limited. The McCutcheon result, which maintains the base limits
on donations to candidates, is easily defended on such free
speech grounds, as much of the plurality opinion demonstrates. 14
10 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 481
(2007) (noting that "[t]hese cases are about political speech") (plurality opinion).
n See id. at 482.
12 See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 349-53 (2010).
13 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1448.
14 Id. at 1448-62.
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What is striking about the Chief Justice's peroration is that
it goes beyond the free speech argument-the right of Shaun
McCutcheon to use money to express his views to a range of
candidates-and makes the case for contributions in terms of
promoting the responsiveness of elected officials to donors. That
is a position more commonly taken by critics of the role of large
campaign contributions in our system-who see large private
contributions as threatening to distort the relationship between
representatives and the public-not by opponents of regulation.
Campaign finance reformers have drawn on the language of
democratic self-government to parry the free speech argument
used by defenders of the current system. The Chief Justice's
rhetoric, thus, represents a bold move to turn campaign finance
reform's theory against reform.
But, as I will suggest, the Chief Justice's contention that
striking down the aggregate donation cap will promote the
accountability of representatives to their constituents not only
fails to persuade, but also underscores exactly what many people
find troubling about the current campaign finance system. Large
donors are often not constituents. Large donations are likely to
make representatives less responsive to their actual
constituents and more attentive to their donors, thereby
undermining the very responsiveness to the people that the
Chief Justice rightly celebrates as "key to the concept of self-
governance." The Chief Justice's rhetoric tries to add democratic
self-government to free speech in making the case against
campaign finance regulation, but an examination of the
constituency-contribution relationship to which his claim calls
attention actually demonstrates the tension between the
Roberts Court majority's program of campaign finance
deregulation and the working of democratic self-government.
I. CONTRIBUTORS, NOT CONSTITUENTS
In congressional elections, most contributors are not
constituents. The Center for Responsive Politics reports that in
the 2013-14 election cycle, candidates for the House of
Representatives received on average 61.3 percent of their
itemized individual contributions from donors outside their
districts, that is, from non-constituents.15 The winners of
15 The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, 2014 Overview: In-District vs Out-of-District:
34 [ 2015
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congressional races were even more dependent on out-of-district
funding, obtaining on average 64.3 percent of their itemized
individual campaign contributions from non-constituent
donors. 16 A total of fifty-three elected Representatives (or 12
percent of the House) received 90 percent or more of their
campaign contributions from outside their districts; an
additional sixty-three Representatives (14 percent of the House)
received 80-89 percent of their itemized individual contributions
from outside their districts.17 With an additional thirty-nine
Representatives obtaining 75-79 percent of their itemized
individual contributions from outsiders,18 more than 35 percent
of the members of the House of Representatives received 75
percent or more of their campaign funds from non-constituents.
The 2014 elections were not an outlier in terms of the heavy
dependence of members of the House on non-constituent
donations. Since the late 1970s, out-of-district donations have
consistently accounted for roughly half the itemized individual
donations to House candidates, and since the late 1990s that
number has regularly been in the three-fifths to two-thirds
range. 19 In 2004, 67 percent of the value of itemized individual
contributions to candidates for the House of Representatives
came from outside the candidate's district.20 That year, in 18
percent of congressional districts, one or more candidates
received 90 percent or more of their itemized donations from
non-constituents. 21 Fewer than twenty percent of the House
Least In-District, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/
district.php?cycle=2014&display-B, archived at http://perma.cc/9NBD-UAEW. The
finding that only 61.3 percent of donations came from constituents applied only to
candidates who received a minimum of $50,000 in itemized contributions, that is
contributions greater than or equal to $200. Federal law requires the reporting of the
information that makes it possible to determine the residence of the donor only for
donations of $200 or more. For all House candidates, including those who obtained less
than $50,000 in itemized donations, the out-of-district share dropped modestly to 57.8%.
See The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, In-District us Out-of-District: All House Candidates,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/district.php?
cycle=2014&display=A, archived at http://perma.ccl75DV-S2QW.
16 The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, 2014 Overview: In-District vs Out-of-District: All
Current Representatives, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/
overview/district.php?cycle=2014&display=M, archived at http: //perma.cc/G88E-WS59.
17 id.
1s Id.
'9 See James G. Gimpel et al., The Check Is in the Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows
in Congressional Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. Sc. 373, 377-78 (2008).
20 Id. at 378.
21 Id.
29] 35
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candidates that year raised even a majority of their itemized
individual donations from within their districts.22 Moreover,
most of the non-constituent money came not from an adjacent
district, but from further away. 23
Last year's Senate candidates were also heavily dependent
on out-of-state funds. Nineteen of the twenty-eight incumbent
Senators who sought reelection in 2014 drew more than 50
percent of their itemized donations from out-of-staters, including
Republican leader Mitch McConnell who collected 78.5 percent
of his itemized individual funds from outside his home state of
Kentucky. 24 Senator McConnell's unsuccessful Democratic
opponent, Alison Lundergran Grimes, was not far behind in her
dependence on out-of-state funds-72 percent of her itemized
22 Id.
23 See id. at 378-79.
24 The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, 2014 Overview: Candidates: Top In-State vs Top
Out-of-State, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https: /www.opensecrets.org/overview
/instvsout.php, archived at http://perma.cc/YXE5-87HE. In addition to the ten
incumbents listed in the "Top In-State vs Top Out-of-State" chart, incumbent senators
running for reelection who received more than half their itemized individual
contributions from out-of-state included Sen. Chris Coons (D-Del.) (69% from out-of-
state), The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Delaware Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=DES2&spec=N,
archived at http://perma.cc/7PUS-WFAA; James Risch (R-Idaho) (78% from out-of-state),
The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Idaho Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=IDS1&spec=N, archived at
http://perma.cc/MM7H-SYXR; Pat Roberts (R-Kansas) (58% from out-of-state), The Ctr.
For Responsive Politics, Kansas Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=KSS1&spec=N, archived at
http://perma.cc/3NJR-LK4P; Susan Collins (R-Me) (68% from out-of-state) The Ctr. For
Responsive Politics, Maine Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at http://www.
opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=MES2&spec=N, archived at http: //
perma.ccl3XPK-VCHS; Jeanne Shaheen (D-NH) (80% from out-of-state) The Ctr. For
Responsive Politics, New Hampshire Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=NHS2&spec=N, archived at
http://perma.cc/5D6T-8TUE; Tom Udalll (D- NM) (53% from out-of-state), The Ctr. For
Responsive Politics, New Mexico Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=NMS2 &spec=N, archived at
http://perma.cc/HM5F-H69H; Jack Reed, (D-RI) (59% from out-of-state), The Ctr. For
Responsive Politics, Rhode Island Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=RIS2&spec=N, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZF3K-DT47; Tim Scott (R-SC) (67% from out-of-state), The Ctr. For
Responsive Politics, South Carolina Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=SCS1&spec=N, archived at
http://perma.cc/ZHJ9-NYJS; Mike Enzi (R-Wyo) (72% from out-of-state), The Ctr. For
Responsive Politics, Wyoming Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at http://www.
opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=WYS2&spec=N, archived at http:I
perma.cc/48H8-7UA3.
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individual contributions came from outside Kentucky. 25 Both
McConnell and Grimes collected significantly more money from
donors living in metropolitan New York than from residents of
metropolitan Louisville. Successful Senate challengers or open-
seat candidates like Tom Cotton (R-Ark.), Shelley Moore Capito
(R-WV), Steven Daines (R-MT), 26 and Joni Ernst (R-lowa)27
obtained most of their funds from out-of-state donors. The top
zip code for itemized individual donations to successful Alaska
Republican challenger Dan Sullivan was in Palm Beach,
Florida, and he received more itemized individual contributions
from the New York metropolitan area than from metropolitan
Anchorage. 28 Altogether, twenty-two of the thirty-six Senate
winners last year received more than half their individual
itemized donations from out-of-state contributors. 29 Six of the
winnerS 30 collected 75 percent or more of these funds from out-
of-state.
These numbers address only the contributions made by
individuals directly to candidates and do not reflect either the
sources of political party committee and political action
committee ("PAC")31 contributions to candidates, or the home
states or districts of donors to Super PACs and 501(c)
committees that spent independently in support of or in
25 The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Kentucky Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
available at http://www.opensecrets.org/races/ geog.php?cycle=2014&id=KYS1&spec=N,
archived at http://perma.ccI72FQ-487A; See also Scott Bland, Leading Senate Recruits
Reliant on Out-of-State Money, NAT'L J., (Feb. 20, 2014), available at http://www.
nationaljournal.com/hotline-on-calllleading-senate-recruits-reliant-on-out-of-state-money
-20140220, archived at http://perma.cclL2GX-6MAE.
26 See 2014 Overview: Candidates, supra note 24.
27 The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Iowa Senate Race, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available
at https://www.opensecrets.org/races/geog.php?cycle=2014&id=IAS2&spec=N, archived
at http: /perma.ccNSF7-YMQX.
28 The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, Sen. Dan Sullivan, OPENSECRETS.ORG,
available at https://www.opensecrets.org/politicians/geog.php?cycle=2014&cid=NO00
35774&newMem=Y&type=I, archived at http://perma.cc/4UMN-RJ3N.
29 There were 36 races because of special elections to fill the remaining portions of
terms of senators who had died or resigned during their terms in Hawaii, Oklahoma, and
South Carolina. The calculation in this and the next footnote is based on the author's
review of the data on the "geography" button of each 2014 Senate Race page on the
Center for Responsive Politics website.
so Senators Cotton (R-Ark), Franken (D-MN), McConnell (R-Ky), Risch (R-Ida),
Shaheen (D-NH), and Sullivan (R-Ak).
31 The term "political action committee" is a colloquial reference to a political
committee that solicits and receives contributions and then makes contributions to, or
engages in independent spending with respect to, a candidate. See 52 U.S.C. § 30101(4).
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opposition to federal candidates. The evidence here is more
anecdotal than comprehensive, but one study of donations to
Super PACs is revealing. That study, conducted while the 2014
campaigns were underway, focused on the thirty-four federal
Super PACs with a state or regional reference in their name,
such as the "Put Alaska First PAC," "Kentuckians for Strong
Leadership," the "Virginia Progress PAC," and "New Hampshire
Priorities." Half of these groups received more than half of their
itemized contributions from out-of-state donors, and nearly all
the money for some of these PACs came from outside the state
the PAC claimed to represent. Thus, 98 percent of the money for
"Put Alaska First PAC," 99 percent of donations to the "Alaska
Salmon PAC," 95 percent of the money for "Kentuckians for
Strong Leadership," 67 percent of the contributions to
"Mississippi Conservatives," 58 percent of donations to the
"Virginia Progress PAC," and 100 percent of the donations to
"New Hampshire Priorities" came from outside the state
indicated in the PAC's name. 32 Indeed, many of these state-
focused PACs were not even registered in their putative home
states: "Empower Nebraska" was based in Tampa, Florida, while
the "American Heartland PAC," which spent exclusively on the
Iowa Senate race, was based far from the heartland in
Washington, D.C. 33
Of course, it could reasonably be argued there is a broad
national stake in the outcome of specific Senate and
Congressional district elections. As the Supreme Court put it in
U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,34 Congress "is not a
confederation of nations in which separate sovereigns are
represented by appointed delegates, but is instead a body
composed of representatives of the people" 35-one people.
Indeed, Edmund Burke made a similar point-about
Parliament, of course-in the very letter Chief Justice Roberts
quoted in McCutcheon when Burke declared that "Parliament is
not a congress of ambassadors from different and hostile
32 Lalita Clozel, Super PAC(ked) With Out-of-State Money, OPENSECRETS.ORG, (Oct.
3, 2014), available at http: lwww.opensecrets.org/news/2014/10/super-packed-with-out-
of-state-money/, archived at http://perma.cc/32LJ-QBQ3.
3 Id. See also The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, American Heartland PAC,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https: /www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/detail.
php?cmte=C00548867&cycle=2014, archived at http://perma.cclWQF9-D4U7.
3 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
3 Id. at 821.
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interests . . . but . .. a deliberative assembly of one nation, with
one interest, that of the whole." 3 6 All members of Congress in
some sense represent all Americans so that non-constituents as
well as constituents have a stake in the outcome of a Senate race
or House district election. Particularly when, as in 2014, the
partisan control of a legislative chamber is up for grabs,
residents of New York, California, and Texas have as direct and
objective a concern in the outcome of closely contested Senate
races in Alaska, Arkansas, and Iowa as the residents of those
states. There may be a tension between representing the
interests of constituents and non-constituents, but that is built
into the structure of Congress.
The growing role of out-of-state and out-of-district
contributions in state and local elections presents a different
issue.37 Although I have not seen any comprehensive studies,
media surveys and scholarly accounts of particular elections
over the last several years chronicle the large and growing role
of non-constituent money in state governorship, 38 state
36 Edmund Burke, Speech to the Electors of Bristol, Nov. 3, 1774, in THE WORKS OF
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE EDMUND BURKE 392 (Henry G. Bohn ed., 1854-56) available at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edulfounders/print-documents/vlchl3s7.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/6KDF-P82U (emphasis omitted).
3 See, e.g., Mary Jo Pitzi & Rob O'Dell, Outside money played huge role in Arizona
elections, THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC (Nov. 8, 2014, 10:27 PM), available at
http: /www.azcentral.com/story/news/arizona/politics/2014/11/09/election-outside-money-
campaign-funding/18751 133/, archived at http://perma.cc/HSE2-8MRF; Chris Kardish,
Outsiders Add Money and Negativity to State and Local Elections, GOVERNING (Oct.
2014), available at http://www.governing.com/topics/elections/gov-outside-spending-
state-local-elections.html, archived at http://perma.cc/7TT4-B68V.
3 See, e.g., Steve Contorno, Terry McAuliffe gets 78% of campaign cash from outside
Virginia, WASHINGTON ExAMINER (Apr. 23, 2013, 12:00 AM), available at
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/terry-mcauliffe-gets-78-of-campaign-cash-from-out
side-virginia/article/2527992, archived at http://perma.cc/5N5X-AVL9); Matea Gold &
Ben Pershing, Groups flush with out-of-state cash flock to Virginia governor's race as
testing ground, WASHINGTON POST (Sept. 22, 2013), available at
http: //www.washingtonpost.com/politics/groups-flush-with-out-of-state-cash-flock-to-vir
ginia-governors-race-as-testing-ground/2013/09/22/1209aeb8-2221-1 1e3-966c-9c4293c47e
be-story. html, archived at http://perma.cc/773N-VB5V; Bill Lueders, Scott Walker tops
Mary Burke in major and out-of-state donations, WIScONSINWATCH.ORG, (July 23, 2014),
available at http://wisconsinwatch.org/2014/07/scott-walker-tops-mary-burke-in-major-
and-out-of-state-donations/, archived at http://perma.cc/9E3Z-J5FY; Mal Leary, Analysis
Indicates Big Increase in Out-of-State Money Pouring into Maine Governor's Race, MAINE
PUBLIC BROADCASTING (Sept. 24, 2014), available at http://news.mpbn.net/post/analysis-
indicates-big-increase-out-state-money-pouring-maine-governors-race, archived at
http://perma.cc/EKR8-UX6H; Derrick DePledge, Mainland super PACs help shape gov's
race, HONOLULU STAR-ADVERTISER (Oct. 28, 2014, 1:30 AM) available at http://www.
staradvertiser.com/elections/20141028-campaignspendingMainland-super-PACs-hel
p-shape-govs race_.html?id=280619322, archived at http://perma.cclY3NX-E39J.
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gubernatorial recall,39 state attorney general, 40 state secretary of
state,41 state judicial42 and judicial retention, 43 state ballot
proposition,44 state legislative,45 state legislative recall, 46 and
" See Walker's Unprecedented Out-of-state Contributions Alarming, ONE
WISCONSIN Now (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://www.onewisconsinnow.org/
press/walkers-unprecedented-out-of-state-contributions-alarming.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/Q4XD-RBEW; Tom Kertscher, Behind the rhetoric: The in-state, out-of-
state campaign money debate, POLITIFACT.COM (May 22, 2012, 6:00 PM), available at
http://www.politifact.com/wisconsin/article/2012/ may/22/behind-rhetoric-state-out-state-
money-debate/, archived at http://perma.cc/J9FP-76J8.
40 See, e.g., Caroline Bleakley, Race for attorney general's seat turns dirty, 8 NEWS
Now (Oct. 27, 2014, 10:07 AM), available at http://www.8newsnow.com/story/27053464/
race-for-attorney-generals-seat-turns-dirty, archived at http://perma.cc/QL5Z-MZ7A; Ben
Wieder, Big Money Comes to State Attorney-General Races, THE ATLANTIC (May 8, 2014),
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/05/us-chamber-targets-
dems-in-state-attorney-general-races/361874/, archived at http://perma.cc/39LE-R6CG;
Luke Broadwater, Out-of-state groups pump money into attorney general's race,
BALTIMORE SUN (June 20, 2014), available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-06-
220/news/ bs-md-attorney-general-funds-20140620_1jon-cardin-attorney-general-frosh,
archived at http://perma.cc/RU37-D8HS; Paul Hammel, Outside money in GOP attorney
general race raises concerns, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD (May 9, 2014, 12:00 AM), available
at http://www.omaha.com/news/outside-money-in-gop-attorney-general-race-raises-con
cerns/articlej7487c8O7-8fef-53d2-b93e-823dc82f9c47.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
DKR3-SH48.
41 See, e.g., Phil Keisling & Sam Reed, The Troubling Partisanization of Elections
for Secretary of State, GOVERNING (Dec. 10, 2014), available at http: //www.governing.
com/columns/smart-mgmt /col-troubling-partisanization-elections-secretary-state.html,
archived at http:I/perma.cc/FG4T-BW6B; Joe Vardon, et. al., Capitol Insider: GOP
Attacks Dem over out-of-state money, COLUMBUS DISPATCH (Aug. 31, 2014, 6:48 AM),
available at http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/locall 2014/08/31/gop-attacks-dem-
over-out-of-state-money.html, archived at http://perma.cclX7HM-RP8F (Ohio Secretary
of State election).
42 See, e.g., Alan Suderman & Ben Wieder, D.C.-based groups bombarded state high
court races with ads, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (June 14, 2102, 8:21 PM),
available at http: //www.publicintegrity.org/2013/06/13/12793/dc-based-groups-
bombarded-state-high-court-races-ads, archived at http://perma.cc/XW29-5YHH; Erik
Eckholm, Outside Spending Enters Arena of Judicial Races, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2014),
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/06/us/politics/outside-spending-transforms-
supreme-court-election-in-north-carolina.html? r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/2JZD-
FPAZ; Joe Palazzolo, Judges Step Up Electioneering as Outside Money Pours Into Races,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 13, 2014), available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-step-up-
electioneering-as-outside-money-pours-into-races-1413149643 (last visited Oct. 1, 2015);
Erik Thueson, Van Dyke too influenced by out-of-state money, HELENA INDEPENDENT
RECORD (Oct. 15, 2014, 10:00 AM), available at http://helenair.com/news/opinion/
vandyke-too-influenced-by-out-of-state-money/article_5e981fea-5b76-5d5b-a54b-78ac660
9074c.html, archived at https://perma.cc/CBS3-ZD7D?type=source (Montana supreme
court election).
43 See, e.g., Linda Casey, Independent Expenditure Campaigns in Iowa Topple Three
High Court Justices, NAT'L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS (Jan. 10, 2011), available
at http: /classic.followthemoney.org//press/ReportView.phtml?r=440, archived at
http://perma.cc/3H7Y-QFC7.
4 See. e.g., Patrick M. Garry et al., Raising the Question of Whether Out-of-State
Political Contributions May Affect a Small State's Political Autonomy: A Case Study of
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even mayor and council elections in cities big-such as Boston47
and Chicago 4 -and small-such as Coralville, lowa.49 This out-
of-state participation in state and local elections is increasingly
systematic, with national party groups-including the
Republican and Democratic Governors' Associations,50 the
Republican State Leadership Committee, and the Democratic
Legislative Campaign Committee5 -and major Super PACs
playing leading roles in state elections. These organizations pull
money from state parties, wealthy individuals, businesses, trade
associations, unions, and other organizations in "donor" states
the South Dakota Voter Referendum on Abortion, 55 S.D. L. REV. 35 (2010); Monica Youn,
Proposition 8 and the Mormon Church: A Case Study in Donor Disclosure, 81 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 2108 (2013); Nigel Jaquiss, Dupont Pioneer Shatters Record for Largest
Oregon Political Donation, WILLAMETTE WEEK (Oct. 24, 2014, 12:34 PM), available at
http://www.wweek.com/portlandfblog-32369-dupont-pioneer-shattersrecord for_1argest
oregon political-contribution.html, archived at http://perma.cc/K4WA-Z7EL ($4.46
million given by Iowa-based business to affect Oregon ballot proposition).
4 See, e.g., Joseph O'Sullivan, How a California billionaire gets his money into a
Washington Senate campaign, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 14, 2014, 6:20 PM), available at
http:/fblogs.seattletimes.com/politicsnorthwest/2014/10/14/how-a-california-billionaire-
gets-his-money-into-one-state-senate-campaign, archived at http://perma.cc/6KLM-
GUMU; Jeff Horseman, DECISION 2014: $2M in outside money flows into state Senate
race, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Oct. 14, 2014, 3:39 PM) available at http://www.pe.com/
articles/money-751927-outside-race.html, archived at http://perma. cc/LBV4-FD83
(California's Senate Dist. #28).
4 Nancy Watzman, Out of state money pouring into Colorado gun recall races,
SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (Sept. 4, 2013, 9:49 AM), available at http: //sunlightfoundation.
com/blog/2013/09/04/colorado-guns/, archived at http://perma.cc/MVU8-PPBE.
4 See Katharine Q. Seelye, Outside Money at Issue in Boston Mayor's Race as Labor
Unions Weigh In, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2013), available at http: //www.nytimes.
com/2013/11/04/us/politics/outside-money-at-issue-in-bston-mayors-race-as-labor-unions
-weigh-in.html.
48 See Bill Ruthhart, With contribution limits off, Emanuel reels in more cash,
CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Nov. 28, 2014, 7:46 AM), available at http: lwww.chicagotribune.com/
news/ct-rahm-emanuel-fundraising-caps-20141127-story.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/PP7Z-A2FF.
49 John Eligon, Koch Group Has Ambitions in Small Races, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3.
2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 2013/11/04/us/politics/koch-group-has-
ambitions-in-small-races.html?pagewanted=all (last visited June 16, 2015).
5 See generally Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The $500 Million Question: Are the
Democratic and Republican Governors Associations Really State PACs under Buckley's
Major Purpose Test? 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POLY 485 (2012); Paul McMorrow, GOP
Super PAC money swamps governor's race, COMMONWEALTH (Nov. 3, 2014), available at
http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/News-and-Features/Online-exclusives/2014/Fall
/020-GOP-super-PAC-money-swamps-governors-race.aspx#.VLAErNEtCUk, archived at
http://perma.cc/634U-Q8HZ.
51 See generally, Nicholas Confessore, A National Strategy Funds State Political
Monopolies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/
12/us/politics/a-national-strategy-funds-state-political-monopolies.html (last visited June
16, 2015).
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and redistribute the funds to state parties, Super PACs, 52 or
candidates in competitive elections in "recipienf' states where
the money may be more useful in advancing the group's partisan
or ideological objectives. The interstate flow of campaign funds
may also reflect differences in state campaign finance laws.
Donors whose home states restrict the size or sources of
campaign funds in state elections can send money to recipient
states where those limits do not apply. 53 Some of this outside
money is contributed to a candidate and some is used for
independent spending. Through both routes, outside groups and
wealthy outside individuals have become major players in
statewide elections, legislative district races, and ballot
proposition contests.
Non-constituent contributions are, thus, an increasingly
significant fact of life in American elections, of widespread
importance not just in those elections where the outsider-donor
is directly governed by the outcome, but in races where the
outsider is truly an outsider, not part of the political community
that is choosing its elected leadership. The growth of non-
constituent contributions reflects and reinforces the growing
nationalization and partisan and ideological polarization of our
electionS 54 at federal, state, and local levels, and in executive,
legislative, judicial, and ballot proposition contests. Some
scholarly observers have praised this development. My
Columbia colleague Jessica Bulman-Pozen contends that such
non-constituent engagement in another state's elections
strengthens federalism by enhancing the role of the states as
"sites of political identification" and enabling them to better
"serve as counterweights to the federal government."5 5 She also
suggests that non-constituent participation in state elections
allows individuals who feel "alienated from their own state
government to affiliate with another state government." 56 In
more traditional First Amendment language Professor E. Todd
51 See, e.g., Fredreka Schouten & Christopher Schnaars, Mega-influence: These 42
dominate super Pac donations, USA TODAY (Oct. 29, 2014, 12:40 PM), available at
http: /www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/10/28/top-super-pac-donors-of-the-mid
terms-steyer-bloomber-singer-mercer/18060219/, archived at http://perma.ccl8YMF-
YSQ6.
5 See Confessore, supra note 51.
54 See Gimpel et al., supra note 19, at 389-92.
55 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 9, at 1082.
56 Id. at 1140.
42 [ 2015
OF CONSTITUENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS
Pettys defends what he nicely refers to as "long-armed"
donations as a form of political association between candidates
and outsiders.57
Certainly outsiders have an interest-whether subjective or
objective-in state, local, and congressional district elections.
And yet there are nagging doubts about the outsider campaign -
financing role. Virtually all the newspaper articles on out-of-
state or out-of-district donations I have cited view the growing
significance of non-constituent contributors with alarm, voicing
the concern that outsiders are taking over the state's or locality's
political process. Candidates typically try to make their rivals'
dependence on campaign money a campaign issue, although the
role of outside money in financing both competitors can make it
difficult for voters to act on that concern. The title of an in-depth
study of the role of outside money in South Dakota's abortion
referendum asked the "Question of Whether Out-of-State
Political Contributions May Affect a Small State's Political
Autonomy."58 Professor Anthony Johnstone's recent article on
"Outside Influence" begins with the accusatory "By what rights
do outsiders influence state or local politics?"59 And retired
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, in his fall 2014
Harold Leventhal Lecture, treated the McCutcheon Courts
"failure to discuss" the distinction between donations by in-
staters versus donations from non-constituents ineligible to vote
in the relevant election as such an egregious oversight that he
concluded the McCutcheon decision ought to be dismissed with
no more than a derisive "Oops!"60
The implication of outside money for self-government is,
thus, a contested one, not resolved by the fact of outsider
interest in the outcome of a state, local, or district election. For
better or worse, outside donors have become a new constituency,
albeit one quite different from the usual meaning of the term.
s7 Pettys, supra note 9, at 90.
58 Garry et al., supra note 44, at 35.
5 Anthony Johnstone, Outside Influence, 13 ELECTION L.J. 117, 117 (2014).
6 Justice John P. Stevens (Ret.), 2014 Harold Leventhal Lecture: Oops!, (Sept. 12,
2014), available at http: //www.dcbar.org/sections/administrative-law-and-agency-
practice/Harold-Levanthal-Talk-Justice-Stevens-Address.cfm, archived at http: //perma.
cc /S5YP-MDHX.
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II. NON-CONSTITUENT CONTRIBUTORS AS A CONSTITUENCY
"Constituenf' has a well-established meaning as one of a
group of citizens who elect a representative to a legislature or
other public body. 61 "Constituenf' is derived from the Latin root
stare- "to stand"-so that a constituent is someone who
"appoints another as agent," presumably to stand for the
constituent. 62 According to the dictionary, a constituent is "a
person who authorizes another to act on his or her behalf, as a
voter in a district represented by an elected official." 63 Moreover,
the role of the constituency is not simply to define the units for
the election of representatives, but to determine to whom the
representative is to be accountable. As political scientist Andrew
Rehfield has explained, "representatives should presumably be
accountable to those who authorized them to act." 64 In the
American context-indeed, in most Western democracies-
constituencies are typically defined geographically, with the
constituents the individuals who are residents of the territory of
the constituency. 65 Shaun McCutcheon of Alabama was surely
not "one of the people who live and vote" 6 6 in the many
constituencies in other states that voted on the candidates to
whom he gave and wanted to give money.
Of course, electoral constituents are not the only people
who, in some sense, may be represented by an officeholder. In a
legislative body, a representative from one district may also
61 See, e.g., ANDREW REHFIELD, THE CONCEPT OF CONSTITUENCY: POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION, DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY, AND INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 35-39
(Cambridge Univ. Press 2005).
62 Id. See also Constituent, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, available at http://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/constituent, archived at http://perma.cc/FE2W-4YZV (A
constituent is "any one of the people who live and vote in an area: a member of a
constituency."); Constituent, DICTIONARY.COM, available at http://dictionary.reference.
com/browse/constituent, archived at http: /perma.cc/HFS9-Q3Y9.
63 See Constituent, DICTIONARY.COM, available at http: /dictionary.reference.com/
browse/constituent, archived at http://perma.cc/HFS9-Q3Y9; Constituent,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, available at http: //www.thefreedictionary.com/constituent,
archived at http://perma.cc/ZA53-3L5P (The second definition of "constituent" as a noun.
The first is the not very helpful: "a constituent element, material, etc.; component.").
' REHFIELD, supra note 61, at 186-87.
65 Id. at xii, 36. See also NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, THE BLUE GUITAR: POLITICAL
REPRESENTATION AND COMMUNITY 12, 74-75 (Univ. Chi. Press 1988).
66 See Constituent, DICTIONARY.COM, available at http: /dictionary.reference.com/
browse/constituent, archived at http://perma.cc/HFS9-Q3Y9; Constituent,
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, available at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/constituent,
archived at http://perma.cc/ZA53-3L5P.
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represent the interests of individuals or groups from other
districts. This may be a matter of demographics: an African-
American or female representative may be more representative
of the interests of African-Americans or women in districts
whose elected representatives are white or male than the
representatives actually elected from those districts. Similarly,
party may be a basis for non-constituent representation, with
elected Democrats representing the interests of Democrats
living in Republican-controlled districts and elected
Republicans similarly representing the interests of Republicans
residents in Democratic districts. So, too, non-constituent
representation may grow out of ideology, as elected
environmentalists, Tea Party members, pro-life or pro-choice
advocates, hawks, or doves may speak on behalf of people with
similar views throughout the nation, not just their state or
district voting constituencies. As political scientist Jane
Mansbridge, who dubbed this phenomenon "surrogate
representation," has explained, such representation "plays the
normatively critical role of providing representation to voters
who lose in their own districf' and thus adds democratic
legitimacy to the electoral system. 67  Such surrogate
representation can offset the lack of proportional representation
for certain groups and add perspectives to legisla-
tive deliberation.68
Jessica Bulman-Pozen has taken Mansbridge's argument
one step further, applying it not just to out-of-district
representation within a legislature but to the cross-border
interest of residents of one state in the political processes of
other states. She argues that the decisions of what I will call the
target state can have an impact on the politics of the non-
constituents home state by "creat[ing] momentum for a
particular policy or political party, [or] . . . build[ing] a real-life
example to inform national debate." 69 In her view, cross-border
political engagement also has psychological benefits to out-of-
staters who can "take comfort in knowing that their preferences
are actual policy-and their partisan group is in control-
67 Jane Mansbridge, Rethinking Representation, 97 AM. POL. SC. REV. 515, 523
(2003).
68 Id.
69 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 9, at 1136.
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somewhere." 0 Bulman-Pozen's normative point is that cross-
border political activity confirms the role of states as "platforms
for national political struggle"7 1 and, thus, strengthens their
significance within the federal system. To that extent, she
believes it is good for federalism. But she has less to say about
the impact of cross-border political activity-particularly the
effect of outside campaign contributions-on the extent to which
state elected officials represent their actual residents and voting
constituents. The evidence on that question is more troubling.
To begin with, only a small fraction of Americans-perhaps
4 percent in the hotly contested 2008 elections-make any
campaign contributions at all. 7 2 And a tiny fraction of that
already very small group actually provides most of the money.
In the 2013-14 federal elections, fewer than 700,000 people-
less than 1/4 of 1 percent of the total population and less than 1/3
of 1 percent of the adult population-donated the itemized
$200+ contributions which together account for 66.7 percent of
all individual contributions to federal candidates, parties, and
PACs.73 And just 18 percent of that already very small group-
the donors who gave $2,600+-accounted for 73 percent of the
itemized donations and 49 percent of total donations. 74 At the
very top, in 2012 (before McCutcheon lifted the federal aggregate
contribution limit) a mere 1/100h of 1 percent of the population
(a little more than 31,000 people) contributed 28 percent of all
itemized federal contributions.7 5 The minimum amount
contributed that qualified a donor for membership in the elite 1
percent of the 1 percent of donors was $12,950, and the median
within the group was $26,584.76 Of course, the contributions of
70 Id. See also Pettys, supra note 9, at 87-88 (noting "social-psychological
incentives" to cross-border political activity).
71 Bulman-Pozen, supra note 9, at 1133.
72 Money in Politics: Who Gives?, AMERICANS FOR CAMPAIGN REFORM, available at
http: lwww.acrreform.org/research/money-in-politics-who-gives/, archived at http://
perma.cc/8GZL-GT82.
7 Center for Responsive Politics, 2014 Overview: Donor Demographics,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/donordemo
graphics.php, archived at http://perma.cc/J55Z-C8QK.
74 Id.
7 Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUND. BLOG (June
24, 2013, 9:00 AM), available at http://sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/
06/24/1pct_ofthel1pct/. This does not count donations to so-called "dark money"
organizations, that is, electorally active 501(c) organizations that do not have to disclose
their donors.
76 id.
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some donors in this group were in the millions of dollars. As a
result, candidates, political parties, and the political committees
that give to candidates and parties or spend independently to
support them are heavily dependent on a relatively small
number of very big givers.
These campaign financiers "come from a narrow stratum of
American society"77 that is demographically different from the
rest of the population. They are, on average, older, better
educated, more likely to be white, more likely to be male, more
affluent,78 more likely to be in business or the professions, and
more partisan or ideologically extreme than the average voter,
with the differences between donors and voters widening for
larger donors.79 The very largest donors tend to be business
owners, chief executive officers, or Fortune 500 or Forbes 400
board members whose fortunes are based in finance, lobbying, or
technology.80 They work at Goldman Sachs, Blackstone,
Kirkland & Ellis, Morgan Stanley, Comcast, Google, and similar
firms.8 1 The leading donors who provide a disproportionate
share of campaign funds are also typically "habitual" donors who
give year in and year out and support multiple candidates in
each election cycle. 82 These donors are more likely to be asked
for donations, to solicit further donations from their business or
social networks, to bundle the donations of others, 83 and to serve
on or head candidates' finance committees. 84 The donors give to
influence elections, affect public policy, and obtain material
benefits for themselves or their businesses.85
7 PETER L. FRANCIA ET AL., THE FINANCIERS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 40
(Colum. U. Press 2003).
78 Id. at 27-41.
79 See, e.g., Raymond J. La Raja & David L. Wiltse, Don't Blame Donors for the
Ideological Polarization of Political Parties: Ideological Change and Stability Among
Political Contributors, 1972-2008, 40 AM. POL. RES. 501, 506, 519 (2012).
" Adam Bonica et al., Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?, 27 J.
ECON. PERSP. 103, 111-16 (2013); Drutman, supra note 75; Kenneth P. Vogel, Big money
breaks out: Top 100 donors give almost as much as 4.75 million small donors combined,
POLITICO (Dec. 29, 2014, 5:32 AM), available at http://www.politico.com/story/
2014/12/top-political-donors- 113833.html, archived at http:I/perma.cclRCM9-ND6G.
8' Drutman, supra note 75.
82 Francia et al., supra note 77, at 19-22.
83 See, e.g., Benjamin L Page et al., Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy
Americans, 11 PERSP. ON POL. 51, 54 (2013).
84 Francia et al., supra note 77, at 95.
8- Id. at 42-49.
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Large and repeat donors have distinctive political views
across the span of economic and social issues,86 and, not
surprisingly, their views appear to be well represented in the
actions of the officials they have helped to elect. Compared with
other Americans, they are more likely to want to balance the
budget through spending cuts than tax increases, to worry about
inflation rather than unemployment, and to favor cutting social
welfare programs.87 A number of recent studies have shown that
these donors appear to have succeeded in their goals, with the
views and voting records of members of Congress far more often
in sync with the views of their affluent donors than with the
views of their voters.88 A survey of several thousand state
legislators recently found that the legislators were quite willing
to acknowledge that the passage of bills in their chamber was
influenced by the financial contributions of individuals and
groups to candidates and parties. 89 More generally, there is
considerable evidence that a wide range of public policies are
more reflective of the views of the affluent than of middle-
income or low-income Americans, with campaign contributions
playing at least some role in influencing this class-based
differential representation.90
In effect, donors have become a distinctive constituency of
their own, influencing both candidate success and government
decision-making. They serve as "gatekeepers" of the electoral
process,9 ' helping to determine which candidates are able to
effectively compete for election, constraining the policy space in
8 Id. at 60-65.
' Page et al., supra note 83, at 55-67.
85 See, e.g., Nicholas 0. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 114 COLUM L.
REv. 283, 289 (2014) ("[T]he voting records of representatives are about six times more
reflective of the views of affluent contributors than they are of the opinions of the
median-income constituent."); Brittany H, Bramlett et al., The Political Ecology of
Opinion in Big-Donor Neighborhoods, 33 POL. BEHAV. 565, 589-90 (2011); Joseph
Bafumi & Michael C. Herron, Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of
American Voters and Their Members in Congress, 104 AM. POL. Sl. REV. 519 (2010).
89 LYNDA W. POWELL, THE INFLUENCE OF CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS IN STATE
LEGISLATURES: THE EFFECTS OF INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICS 21-24 (U. Mich. Press
2012).
9 See, e.g., Stephanopoulos, supra note 88, at 341-42; Christopher Ellis,
Understanding Economic Biases in Representation: Income, Resources, and Policy
Representation in the 11Oh House, 65 POL. RES. Q. 938, 948 (2012); MARTIN GILENS,
AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA
239-52 (Princeton Univ. Press 2012); LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED AGE 252-82 (Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
9' La Raja & Wiltse, supra note 79, at 506; Drutman, supra note 75.
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which elected officials operate, and shaping the agenda for
government action.92 For some elected officials, "knowing the
interests of their financial constituents is just as important as
knowing the opinions of their voting constituents." 93 These
financial constituents are likely to have different concerns than
non-donor voters and prefer different policy alternatives than
non-donor constituents.94 As Senator Chris Murphy (D-Conn.)
nicely put it, "I talked a lot more about carried interesf' (that is,
the tax treatment of the profits that private equity and hedge
fund managers earn on investments) in calls to donors "than I
did in the supermarket." 9 5 Moreover, financial constituents are
more likely to seek direct access to elected officials (including
legislators from districts other than their own) 96 to present their
views and to get that access when they want it.91
This effect of large campaign contributions on the
representation of non-donor voters is compounded by the
donations of non-constituent contributors. Non-constituent
donors, particularly those who contribute in multiple campaigns,
are even more affluent, better educated, more partisan, and
more ideological than donors generally.98 They tend to live with
people like themselves in distinctive high-wealth neighborhoods
within cosmopolitan areas, and to have little or no connection to
or interest in the people of the states or districts to which they
send their campaign dollars-other than seeking to influence
the outcome of their elections.99 The communities whose
residents have the greatest propensity to give are high wealth
and politically-connected enclaves, including the most affluent
suburbs in major metropolitan areas. In 2012, the places with
the highest rates of donations included Chevy Chase, Maryland,
Bloomfield Hills, Michigan, Palm Beach, Florida, and
92 Bramlett et al., supra note 88, at 590.
9 Francia et al., supra note 77, at 162.
94 Page et al., supra note 83, at 55-68.
95 Drutman, supra note 75.
9 See Francia et al., supra note 77, at 122-26; Page et al., supra note 83, at 54.
97 See Joshua L. Kalla & David E. Broockman, Congressional Officials Grant Access
Due to Campaign Contributions: A Randomized Field Experiment, AM. J. POL. SC.
(forthcoming), available at https://www.ocf.berkeley.edul-broockma/kalla-broockman
donor-access-field-experiment.pdf.
98 Francia et al., supra note 77, at 90; Gimpel et al., supra note 19, at 374, 379, 389-
92; La Raja & Wiltse, supra note 79, at 506.
9 Gimpel et al., supra note 19, at 374, 379, 389-90.
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Greenwich, Connecticut.100 So, too, in absolute dollars, most
federal campaign contributions come from relatively few places.
In the 2005-06 election cycle, 77 percent of all itemized
individual federal campaign contributions came from 5 percent
of all zip codes.101 Another study focused on a slightly earlier
period found that 20 percent of Congressional districts provided
a majority of the itemized individual campaign funds. 102 In the
2013-14 federal elections, itemized individual donations were
disproportionately from the Washington, D.C., New York, and
San Francisco metropolitan areas-in other words, from
lobbyists, Wall Street, and Silicon Valley.103 Indeed, ten zip
codes (all in New York, Washington, San Francisco, and
Chicago) generated more than $233 million in itemized
campaign contributions, or roughly the same amount as the
total sum provided by the bottom 25 states (ranked by the
amount of their campaign donations). 104 Washington, D.C.-
which elects no senators and has a single non-voting
representative in the House of Representatives-provided as
much money in itemized individual elections in the last federal
election cycle as the residents of 29 states.105 It appears that the
slogan embraced by the District of Columbia's distinctive
"Taxation without Representation" license plate106 is mistaken,
as the District is exceedingly well-represented through its
campaign donations in federal elections. The role of the
Washington area, in particular, is likely to grow in the post-
McCutcheon era as "K Street's familiar refrain to candidates'
pleas for campaign cash-'I've maxed ouf-was no longer
100 Drutman, supra note 75.
101 Bramlett et al., supra note 88, at 566.
102 Gimpel et al., supra note 19, at 382.
103 The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, 2014 Overview: Top Metro Areas,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topmetro.php,
archived at http://perma.cc/9JMC-BMSX.
104 Compare The Ctr. For Responsive Politics 2014 Overview: Top Zip Codes,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/topzips.php,
archived at http://perma.cc/8MTU-FPWA, with The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, 2014
Overview: Contributions by State, OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https://www.
opensecrets.org/overview/statetotals.php, archived at http://perma. cc/YT93-8VK2.
10 The Ctr. For Responsive Politics, 2014 Overview: Contributions by State,
OPENSECRETS.ORG, available at https://www.opensecrets.org/overview/statetotals.php,
archived at http://perma.cc/8L89-RY73.
10 See Taxation Without Representation - Vehicle Tags, D.C. DEP'T OF MOTOR
VEHICLES, available at http://dmv.dc.gov/service/taxation-without-representation-
vehicle-tags, archived at http: //perma.cc/9HFJ-YH5M.
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operative."107 It is perhaps ironic that if cross-border donations
are strengthening the political role of the states, so much money
is coming from a place that is not a state at all.
In the system of representative government, voting
constituencies use elections to select the representatives who
will act for them, to empower those representatives, and through
the grant or denial of reelection, to make those representatives
accountable for their actions and responsive to constituent
concerns. The design of constituencies both expresses the
political values of a society 08 and shapes the kinds of policies
and programs representatives will pursue. 109 Our campaign
finance system gives our elected representatives a second
constituency-a contributor constituency frequently composed of
non-members of the voting constituency. The contributor
constituency often has no right to vote for the representatives
but by contributing or threatening to withhold money (or
threatening to give to an opponent) it can help determine which
candidates will be able to campaign effectively to the voting
constituency and who can seek re-election. They may not
determine who wins elections but they are often crucial to
making election possible. Elected officials, in turn, are
influenced to act in ways that maintain the flow of campaign
dollars. In so doing, they represent constituencies that do not
elect them, as well as those that do. Not only does the
contributor constituency have a very different relationship to the
elected representatives than the voting constituency, but
contributor constituents often have different political concerns
and goals that have may have little relationship to, and may in
fact be at odds with, the concerns and goals of the residents of
the voting constituency. The campaign finance system may
promote accountability to constituents, but it is accountability to
the contributor constituency, not the voting constituency that
nominally empowers the representatives to act and that
legitimates their authority.
1'0 Kevin Bogardus, Meet the New Super Donors, CAMPAIGNS & ELECTIONS (Nov. 24,
2014), available at http://www.campaignsandelections.com/magazine/2367/meet-the-
new-super-donors, archived at http://perma.ccf'N8H-QELH.
'0 See Schwartz, supra note 65, at 19.
109 See Rehfield, supra note 61, at 147.
29] 51
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
III. NON-CONSTITUENT CONTRIBUTIONS AND CAMPAIGN
FINANCE LAW
In his Harold Leventhal Lecture, Justice Stevens pointed
out that the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the
question of whether a citizen of one state has a constitutionally
protected interest in giving money to a candidate running for
office in another state. He argues that the right to contribute
can, like the right to vote itself, be limited to residents of the
jurisdiction holding the election.110 Although the Supreme Court
itself has never directly considered the question,'11 the issue has
come up in a handful of state and lower federal court cases and
has generally, albeit not consistently, been resolved in favor of
the non-constituent contributor. As I explain in this Part, that is
very likely how the current Supreme Court would resolve the
issue. States and localities may-and do-adopt measures to
stimulate constituent contributions, but there is probably
nothing they can do to stem the flow of non-
constituent donations.
The case for limiting non-constituent contributions builds
on the Supreme Court's statement in Holt Civic Club v. City of
Tuscaloosall2 that "our cases have uniformly recognized that a
government unit may legitimately restrict the right to
participate in its political processes to those who reside within
its borders."'1 3Although Holt Civic Club dealt only with the right
to vote in local elections, it may be said to stand for a broader
principle of democratic self-government in which the
representative institutions of a political community like a city or
state are controlled by the members of that community, which is
to say, its residents. The residency principle is incorporated in
n0 Justice John P. Stevens (Ret.), supra note 60.
n. As noted earlier in this article, the Court was surely aware that the thrust of
Shaun McCutcheon's lawsuit was to enable him to make contributions in out-of-state
elections. In other campaign finance cases, the Court also dealt with claims by out-of-
state parties. For example, in American Tradition Partnership v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct.
2490 (2012), in which the Court invalidated Montana's law banning corporate campaign
expenditures, the lead plaintiff was incorporated under the laws of Colorado. See
Western Tradition Partnership v. Attorney General, 271 P.3d 1, 4 (Mont. 2011), rev'd,
132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012).
112 439 U.S. 60 (1978).
" Id. at 68-69 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972); Evans v.
Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 422 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621,
625 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 91 (1965); Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621
(1904)).
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the many state laws that require a candidate to be a resident of
the jurisdiction he or she seeks to represent'1 4 and that count
only state residents in determining whether a petition has
enough signatures to qualify a candidate or proposition for a
place on the ballot,115 and, more contentedly, that require that
petition circulators also be state residents.116
Campaign finance doctrine, by contrast, has been framed in
terms of the First Amendment freedoms of speech and
association. It involves campaigning, not casting ballots or
placing candidates or issues on ballots. The Supreme Court has
114 See e.g., Michael J. Pitts, Against Residency Requirements, 2015 U. CHI L. FORUM
341 (2015). Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, §2, cl. 2 (requiring a member of the House of
Representatives "when elected" to be an "inhabitant of that state in which he shall be
chosen"); art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (same for a United States Senator). The principal controversies
concerning candidate residency rules have turned on state durational residency
requirements as well as the determination of what constitutes residency.
u1 See Johnstone, supra note 59, at 129 ("Excluding outsiders from signing petitions
is uncontroversial.").
116 See Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 197
(1999) (assuming, without deciding, that a petition circulator residency requirement
would be upheld, while striking down the requirement that circulators be registered
voters); id. at 211 (noting that a state has a "compelling" interest in requiring petition
circulators to be residents) (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 217-18 (suggesting that the
Court would uphold the more restrictive requirement that petition circulators be
registered voters in the state) (O'Connor, J., joined by Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 226-32 (suggesting that the Court would uphold the more
restrictive requirement that petition circulators be registered voters in the state)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Nineteen states and the District of Columbia have adopted
a residency requirement for petition circulators. See Johnstone, supra note 59, at 130.
See also Initiative & Referendum Inst. v Jaeger, 241 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 2001). But see
Nader v. Blackwell, 545 F.3d 459 (6th Cir. 2008) (invalidating state residency
requirement for circulating petition to place independent presidential candidate on the
ballot). Some lower courts have invalidated more restrictive rules requiring that
candidate ballot petition circulators be registered voters of the relevant political
subdivision in which the candidate seeks to run, see, e.g., Krislov v. Rednour, 226 F.3d
851 (7th Cir. 2000), or that a signature witness be a resident of the political subdivision.
See, e.g., Lerman v. Bd. of Elections of the City of New York, 232 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2000),
Molinari v. Powers, 82 F.Supp.2d 57 (E.D.N.Y. 2000); Morrill v. Weaver, 224 F.Supp.2d
882 (E.D. Pa. 2002); Frami v. Ponto, 255 F.Supp.2d 962 (W.D. Wis. 2003). Much of the
debate over residency requirements for petition circulators and witnesses has focused on
ballot integrity, specifically the concern that if questions are raised about the validity of
signatures it may be difficult to find and bring to court non-resident circulators or
witnesses in the time-constrained period necessary to resolve the questions. See, e.g.,
Buckley, 525 U.S. at 196-97; Jaeger, 241 F.3d at 616. Several courts have found that
there are means less restrictive than residency, such as requiring circulators to give
advance consent to state court jurisdiction and detailed personal and residency
information, addressing this issue. See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Virginia v. Judd, 718
F.3d 308 (4th Cir. 2013); Citizens in Charge v. Gale, 810 F. Supp. 2d 916 (D. Neb. 2011).
See also Voting for America, Inc. v. Steen, 732 F.3d 382 (5th Cir. 2013) (rejecting First
Amendment challenge to a Texas law requiring that volunteer deputy voter registrars be
Texas residents).
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protected the rights of minors too young to vote to make
contributions to candidates and political parties,"' as well as
the rights of corporations ineligible to vote to make campaign
expenditures. 18 The only interests the Supreme Court has
recognized as justifying restrictions on contributions are the
prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption," 9
and the prevention of the circumvention of valid anti-corruption
restrictions.1 2 0 As McCutcheon indicates, anti-corruption does
not easily justify restrictions on dollar-limited non-
constituent donations.
Challengers to laws permitting non-constituent donations
and defenders of laws limiting them have sought to break this
distinction between campaigning and voting by claiming that
the right to give money can be tied to the right to vote. They
have sought to invoke the concept of the "republican form of
government," with the assertion that outside money threatens
the voter control of government at the heart of self-government.
Although the argument has had some traction in court, it has
generally failed.
On two occasions, third-party candidates for Congress and
their supporters challenged FECA's "authorization" of-in
reality, its failure to limit or bar-out-of-state or out-of-district
contributions in congressional campaigns. In the first case, in
1995 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
summarily rejected the claim. The court found that the plaintiffs
lacked standing because an invalidation of FECA's contribution
provisions would not provide them the remedy of curtailing
outsider contributions, and it dismissed plaintiffs' request to bar
competing candidates from accepting out-of-state donations as
"frivolous."121 The court noted plaintiffs' contention, growing out
of the republican form of government guarantee, that "the
Constitution entitles them to representation by someone not
beholden to any citizen of another state" and acknowledged "it
can be argued that pure localism affords better
n1 McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 231-32 (2003).
118 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 310.
119 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26-29.
120 See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 159 (2003); Fed.
Election Comm'n v. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 446-47,
456, n. 18 (2001).
121 Whitmore v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 68 F.3d 1212, 1214-16 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
den. 517 U.S. 1155 (1996).
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representation."1 22 But the court also made the opposite point
that "one could argue to the contrary that a Representative acts
on matters affecting the interests of all Americans, so all
Americans should have the right to express themselves on who
ought to be a Representative." 12 3 Without actually determining
which is the better argument, the court observed that limits on
out-of-state donations "may violate the rights of out-of-state
contributors," noted that "[n]o statute or precedent supports
plaintiffs' claims," and concluded that as the Guarantee Clause
is not judicially enforceable, the claims must be dismissed.124
The federal district court for the District of Columbia
reached the same result in a very similar case nine years later.
Again, the court found plaintiffs lacked standing as invalidating
FECA's contribution provisions would not redress their
"grievance" concerning the flow of out-of-state money to their
major party opponents. 125 This court was also somewhat clearer
in acknowledging that non-constituents have a right to
contribute in federal elections, observing that barring out-of-
state money from a United States Senate race would be an
"unprecedented limitation on constitutional freedom." 12 6
These challenges to FECA sought to compel courts to
impose restrictions on out-of-state or out-of-district
contributions but did not consider the constitutionality of laws
actually targeting non-constituent campaign donations. That
issue has come up in cases from three states that restricted
outsider money, with the courts divided concerning both the
analysis and the results.
In 1994, Oregon voters passed Ballot Measure 6, which
amended the state constitution to bar state candidates from
using or directing any contributions other than those given by
"individuals who at the time of their donation were residents of
the electoral district of the public office sought by the
candidate." 127 A second section of the amendment implicitly
permitted state candidates to take up to ten percent of their
funds from non-constituent donors but then provided that any
122 Id. at 1216.
123 id.
124 Id. (emphasis added).
125 Sykes v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 335 F. Supp. 2d 84, 90-93 (D.D.C. 2004).
126 Id. at 93.
127 VanNatta v. Keisling, 899 F. Supp. 488, 491 (D. Ore. 1995).
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candidate who is more than ten percent non-constituent-funded
would forfeit his or her office if the candidate won the election,
and it barred both elected and defeated candidates who violated
the limit on outside funds from holding an elected public office
for twice the term of the office sought. 128 In VanNatta v.
Keisling,129 the Oregon federal district court held Measure 6
unconstitutional. Following Buckley v. Valeo,130 the court found
that contributions are political speech protected by the First
Amendment and that the restriction burdened the speech and
associational rights of out-of-district donors by limiting the
amount of their donations that may be used by candidates. 131
Although the court struck down the entire measure, its analysis
focused exclusively on the effect of the law on out-of-district
rather than out-of-state donors. The court emphasized that
"[ellected officials in state offices impact all state residents, not
just the candidate's constituents within his election district.
Therefore, the Measure impairs out-of-district residents from
associating with a candidate for state office who, if elected, will
have a real and direct impact on those persons." 132 Turning to
the public interests Buckley determined would justify
contribution restrictions-the prevention of corruption and its
appearance-the court held that the Measure was not properly
tailored to address these anti-corruption concerns as it would
permit both large out-of-district donations if they did not exceed
ten percent of a candidate's total expenditures and large in-
district contributions. 13 3
A divided Ninth Circuit panel affirmed. 134 All three judges
agreed that contributions to political campaigns are protected by
the First Amendment, that the Measure burdened the right to
contribute, and that the standard of review of contribution
restrictions is "rigorous" but not strict scrutiny. 135 The panel
unanimously concluded that the restriction on out-of-district
128 id.
129 899 F. Supp. 488 (D. Ore. 1995).
120 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
1a1 VanNatta, 899 F. Supp. at 496.
132 Id. at 497.
1as Id. The law imposed no dollar limits on in-district contributions.
'" VanNatta v. Keisling, 151 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. den. sub nom. Miller v.
VanNatta, 525 U.S. 1104 (1999).
13s VanNatta, 151 F.3d at 1220-21. The district court had erroneously applied strict
scrutiny. VanNatta, 899 F. Supp. at 496.
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contributions could not be justified by Buckley's anti-corruption
concerns because the Amendment applied to all such
contributions "regardless of size or any other factor that would
tend to indicate corruption" and there was no "evidence which
demonstrates that all out-of-district contributions lead to the
sort of corruption discussed in Buckley."13 6
The panel, however, divided over the question whether the
restrictions could be justified by the state's interest in
preserving its republican form of government. Citing to Supreme
Court cases dealing with the right to vote and upholding laws
limiting access to a state's public schools to the state's residents,
Judge Brunetti's dissent emphasized the state's "strong interest
in ensuring that elected officials represent those who elect them"
and in "ensuring that only those who are constituents
participate in the electoral process." 137  Measure 6's
differentiation between constituents and non-constituents for
purposes of making campaign contributions was comparable to
"residency requirements for voting."138 Invoking Austin v.
Michigan Chamber of Commerce139-at that time still good
law-he situated the restriction on non-constituent donations
within Austin's determination that a state could limit the role of
corporate treasury funds in elections to be sure that
"expenditures reflect actual public support for the political ideas
espoused by corporations." 140 In his view, the relevant '"actual
public support' in the context of protecting elections from unfair
influences . .. is by definition limited to those who are eligible to
vote, i.e. district residents."141 He found Measure 6 to be a
"manifestation of the state of Oregon's judgment that out-of-
district donations have the potential for undue influence"-a
judgment which, under Austin, he concluded deserved
"considerable deference." 142 Noting that Measure 6 did not
restrict independent expenditures by outsiders, Judge Brunetti
concluded that the burden on First Amendment rights was
1as VanNatta, 151 F.3d at 1221.
137 Id. at 1222, 1224.
1' Id. at 1225.
1as 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
140 Id. at 660.
141 VanNatta, 151 F.3d at 1222.
142 Id. at 1224.
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modest and justified by the state's interest in "ensur[ing] the
integrity of political structures and processes."1 43
The majority, however, voted to invalidate the Measure.
The majority dismissed the relevance of the right-to-vote case
law to "the right to First Amendment speech" and, in a sentence,
summarily concluded that Measure 6 "is not saved by the
argument that it protects the republican form of government."l 44
The following year a unanimous Alaska Supreme Court in
State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union145 upheld against a First
Amendment challenge an Alaska law limiting the aggregate
amounts of contributions that state candidates, political parties,
or political committees can receive from non-Alaska residents.
Candidates for governor and lieutenant governor could receive
no more than $20,000 in the aggregate from all nonresident
individuals; a candidate for the state senate could accept no
more than a total of $5,000 from out-of-staters; candidates for
state representative or municipal office could take only $3,000
from non-Alaskans; and contributions from out-of-state
individuals could amount to no more than 10 percent of the total
contributions accepted each year by state political parties and
other political groups. 146 As the Alaska court noted, the Alaska
measure was less restrictive than Oregon's in that it limited
only out-of-state donations and did not attempt to restrict inter-
district contributions within the state, so that all Alaskans could
contribute to candidates for state office. 147
Without expressly invoking the republican form of
government concept, the court implicitly relied on it in finding,
as Judge Brunetti had, that the state had an interest-akin to
the anti-distortion one recognized by the Supreme Court in
Austin-in controlling the "corrupting influence" of
''cumulatively vast out-of-state contributions . . . from drowning
out the voices of Alaska residents." 4 8 Recognizing that the caps
13 Id. at 1225.
144 Id. at 1218.
145 State v. Alaska Civil Liberties Union, 978 P.2d 597 (Alaska 1999), cert. den., 120
S. Ct. 1156 (2000).
14 Id. at 614-15, n. 110. The law also prohibited state candidates from accepting
contributions from a group organized under the laws of another state, resident in
another state, or whose participants were not residents of Alaska when the contribution
was made. See id. at n. 111.
141 Id. at 616.
' Id. at 616-17.
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would preclude even small donations once the statutory ceilings
were reached, the Court emphasized that:
nonresident contributions may be individually modest,
but can cumulatively overwhelm Alaskans' political
contributions. Without restraints, Alaska's elected
officials can be subjected to purchased or coerced
influence which is grossly disproportionate to the support
nonresidents' views have among the Alaska electorate,
Alaska's contributors, and those most intimately affected
by elections, Alaska residents. 149
Blending anti-corruption and republican self-government
concerns together, the court concluded that although "[o]utside
influence plays a legitimate part in Alaska politics" nonresident
contributions may be limited "to prevent elected officials from
becoming beholden to those influences."5 o
Three years later, however, the federal district court for
Vermont in Landell v. Sorrel165 1 reached a very different result.
Landell invalidated Vermonts law imposing a 25 percent cap on
the percentage of funds state candidates, political parties, and
PACs could accept from out-of-staters. 15 2 The court found that
the law burdened First Amendment rights because it would bar
some potential donors from contributing to state candidates, and
that it was not justified by anti-corruption concerns. "[M]ost if
not all of the examples of allegedly suspicious out-of-state
contributions" presented by the state to justify the law "also
happened to be large and often from special interest groups that
are viewed by the public stereotypically as the source of
suspicious campaign money. There was no evidence that the fact
that the money came from out-of-state is necessarily the root of
the problem." 153 The court also implicitly rejected the republican
self-government concern when it found that "many people
outside of Vermont have legitimate stakes in Vermont politics,
and therefore have a right to participate in Vermont elections.
Individuals from outside Vermont who are nevertheless
149 Id. at 617.
150 Id.
15' 118 F. Supp. 2d 459 (D. Vt. 2000).
112 Id. at 484.
153 id.
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influenced by Vermont law must have some access to the
political process here."1 5 4
A Second Circuit panel unanimously affirmed. 55 Like the
district court, the appellate judges framed the question entirely
in First Amendment terms, limited the justifications for
restricting campaign contributions to the prevention of
corruption, and found no evidence that out-of-state donors raise
a particular danger of corruption.1 56 Indeed, in the courts view,
the state's drawing of an in-state/out-of-state distinction
smacked of viewpoint discrimination: "the government does not
have a permissible interest in disproportionately curtailing the
voices of some, while giving others free rein, because it questions
the value of what they have to say."15 7 The Alaska Supreme
Courts recognition of a state's interest in shaping its electoral
system to be more accountable to state residents was summarily
dismissed by the Second Circuit, which concluded "we are
unpersuaded that the First Amendment permits state
governments to preserve their systems from the influence,
exercised only through speech-related activities, of
non-residents."15 8
With the results in the cases directly considering challenges
to non-constituent contributions somewhat mixed, it may be
that the most significant case is one that did not actually
address the issue but that still articulated powerful arguments
for both sides of the question. In Bluman v. Federal Election
Commission,159 a three-judge panel of the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia upheld the federal law 60
banning foreigners, other than lawful permanent residents, from
donating money to candidates in federal or state elections,
contributing to the national political parties and other political
committees, or making independent expenditures or
electioneering communications in federal elections. In an
154 id.
1,s Landell v. Sorrell, 382 F.3d 91 (2d Cir. 2002), rev'd on other issues sub. nom.
Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006).
156 Landell, 382 F.3d at 146-48.
1-7 Id. at 148.
158 Id. at 148.
159 800 F.Supp.2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff'd mem. 132 S. Ct. 1087 (2012).
io 52 U.S.C. § 30121. At the time of the Bluman decision, the provision at issue was
2 U.S.C. § 441e(a). The election law provisions of the U.S. Code have since been
reorganized and recodified.
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opinion by Judge Kavanaugh, the court determined that the
United States "has a compelling interest for purposes of First
Amendment analysis in limiting the participation of foreign
citizens in activities of American democratic self-government." 161
More to the point, campaign contributions and expenditures
"constitute part of the process of democratic self-government'
because they "are an integral aspect of the process by which
Americans elect officials to federal, state, and local government
offices." 1 62 The campaign activities financed by contributions and
expenditures-including advertisements, speeches, rallies, and
get-out-the-vote drives-"are part of the overall process of
democratic self-government." 1 63 Indeed, "[s]pending money to
contribute to a candidate or party or to expressly advocate for or
against the election of a political candidate is participating in
the process of democratic self-government." 164 Not only can the
government bar foreigners from voting and holding elected office
but "[i]t follows" that the government may also bar foreign
citizens who are not lawful permanent residents "from
participating in the campaign process that seeks to influence
how voters will cast their ballots in the election. 165
If the court had stopped there then Bluman would provide
powerful rhetorical and logical support for laws constraining
non-constituent donations generally. The same nexus linking
membership in the political community to participation in the
processes of democratic self-government and the finding that the
giving and spending of campaign money is as "integral" a part of
those processes as voting and running for office ought to apply to
all donors from outside the constituency, not just non-
Americans. However, the opinion did not stop there. Rather
Judge Kavanaugh went on to indicate that the relevant
distinction is not between members of specific political
communities-such as constituents of a state, city, or legislative
district-and nonconstituents, but between members of the
American political community writ large and non-Americans.
"[C]itizens of other states and municipalities are all members of
161 Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288.
162 Id.
16 Id.
164 Id. at 289-90.
165 Id. at 288.
29] 61
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
the American political community." 166 As a result "[t]he
compelling interest that justifies Congress in restraining foreign
nationals' participation in American elections-namely,
preventing foreign influence over the U.S. government-
does not apply equally to . .. citizens of other states
and municipalities."16 7
In other words, the music of Bluman-its treatment of
campaign finance as integral to democratic self-government, its
association of campaign money with voting and candidacy, and
its assumption that participation in self-government can be
limited to political community members-makes the case for the
authority to restrict non-constituent contributions, but the
specific words-which treat "the American political community"
as the relevant political community for campaign finance
purposes-constitute a powerful rejection of the possibility of
curbing non-constituent donations. Although technically dicta,
Bluman's language undermines the argument for tying the right
to make campaign contributions to eligibility to vote or hold
office within a constituency.
It is virtually certain that the Supreme Court would
invalidate laws that target contributions by non-constituents,
including those that limit the amount or percentage of total
donations a candidate or political committee may accept from
non-constituents as well as laws that ban non-constituent
donations outright. Contribution restrictions burden the speech
and associational rights of would-be donors, are subject to
exacting judicial review, and must be closely tailored to
advancing the public interest in preventing corruption and its
appearance. The current Court has emphasized that corruption
means simply "quid pro quo" corruption and not the influence on
or access to government that big spenders and donors may
obtain. 168 As both the Ninth and Second Circuits have noted,
there is no reason to believe that a donation from a non-
constituent presents a greater danger of corruption than a
donation of comparable size from a constituent. Citizen United's
rejection of Austin's theory of distortion corruption169 fatally
undercuts the position of the Ninth Circuit dissent and the
116 Id. at 290.
167 id.
168 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450-59.
169 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 349-51.
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Alaska Supreme Court that a state can protect its elections from
campaign money that is not reflective of the views of voters
within a state or district. The democratic self-government
argument which supports the authority of a political community
to limit voting, candidacy, and the signing of ballot petitions to
constituency members is unlikely to provide support for a
community's claim to be able to limit campaign finance
participation to community members.
With the rights of non-voting minors to make contributions
and of corporations and unions to make independent
expenditures previously established, campaign finance has
already been separated from voting. Campaign finance involves
efforts to influence voters, or to provide candidates, parties, and
political committees with the resources to do so. Although, as
Bluman acknowledges, influencing and funding the influencing
of voter decisions are intimately connected with the electoral
process, they do not actually entail the formal acts of voting or
placing candidates and propositions on the ballot. The latter
may be reserved for community residents, but as a matter of
First Amendment jurisprudence, the former are rights available
to members of the American political community as a whole.
To be sure, Alaska's restrictions on out-of-state donations
remain on the books, and at least one other state-Hawaii-also
places an aggregate cap on the percentage of total contributions
a state candidate may receive from non-residents.170 It is
revealing that all the states that have sought to control the
electoral impact of out-of-state money-Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon,
Vermont-have relatively small populations and, thus, perhaps
well-founded fears of the potential power of out-of-state money
to influence state government decision-making. But at this point
the Alaska and Hawaii laws appear to be legal outliers, ripe for
constitutional challenge, rather than precedents for or
harbingers of efforts to control outside influence.
In one aspect of campaign finance law, however, a
preference for in-state or in-district donors over outsiders is
well-established: public funding. States and localities that
provide candidates with public funds typically condition the
eligibility for funding on the candidates collecting a certain
"0 HAw. REV. STAT. § 11-362 (2010). The cap is 30 percent of all donations for each
election period, with an exemption for donations from a member of the candidate's
immediate family.
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number or dollar value of small qualifying contributions. Most
go further 171 and require that the qualifying contributions be
provided entirely or primarily by "qualified elector[s],"172
"registered voters,"1 73 "individuals eligible to vote,"1 74 or
residents of the state or constituency.17 5 Public funding
171 But not all. Some jurisdictions link the availability of public funds to candidates
who have raised a certain number of small donations from individuals without further
requiring that the individuals be state or district residents or voters. See, e.g., MD. CODE
ANN., ELEC. LAW § 15-102 (d) (West 2015) ("eligible private contribution" is contribution
from an individual, up to $250); MASS. GEN LAWS ANN. 55C § 1 (West 2015) (qualifying
contribution is "any contribution made by an individual" under $250); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 19:44A-33 (West 2015); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-25-20 (West 2014).
172 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-946(B)(1) (West 2014).
173 See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1125 (3) (2014) (qualifying contributions
for candidates for governor must come from "registered voters of this State;" for
candidates for the state senate and state house of representatives, the qualifying
contributions must come from "registered voters from the candidate's electoral division");
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 1-19A-2(H)(1) (West 2014) (qualifying contribution must be "made by
a registered voter who is eligible to vote for the covered office that the applicant
candidate is seeking'); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-12-3(14) (West 2014) ("qualifying
contribution" enabling candidate to participate in pilot public financing program for the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals can be provided only by a "West Virginia
registered voter").
" See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.323(a)(1) (West 2015) ("individuals eligible to
vote in this state").
17 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-704(a) (West 2015). Under Connecticues
Citizens' Election Fund Program, to qualify for public funds, a candidate for governor
must collect $250,000 in contributions from individuals, counting only $100 from any
individual, with $225,000 (90% of the total) provided by "individuals residing in the
state." Similarly, candidates for statewide office must collect $75,000 from individuals,
with 90 percent of the total ($67,500) coming from individuals residing in the state.
Candidates for state senate must collect $15,000, counting no more than $100 per
donation from at least 300 individuals "residing in municipalities included, in whole or
in parf' in the relevant senate district, and a candidate for the assembly must obtain
$5,000, including contributions from at least 150 individuals, "residing in municipalities
included, in whole or in part, in the districe' counting no more than $100 per donor. See
also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106-33 (2)(b) (West 2014) ("contributions from individuals who at
the time of contributing are not state residents may not be used to meet the threshold
amounts" in public funding program for candidates for statewide office; HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 11-429(a) (West 2014) (qualifying contributions for public funding program for
candidates for governor, lieutenant governor, county mayor, or prosecuting attorney
must come from "individual residents of Hawaii"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 169.212
(West 2014) (qualifying contribution for public funding program for candidates for
governor "does not include a contribution by an individual who resides outside of this
state"); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 14-204(2) (McKinney 2014) (threshold for eligibility for public
funding for candidates for state comptroller can be met only with contributions from
"residents of New York state"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 §2984(b) (West 2014); N.Y.C.
ADMIN. CODE §§3-702(3), 3-703(2) (defining "matchable contribution" as contribution
from "a natural person resident in the city of New York" and then setting threshold
amounts of matchable contributions to be eligible for public funding in elections for city-
wide office and city council); L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 49.7.23(C)(1)(d) (2013) (starting in
2015, qualifying contributions must come from "individuals residing within the City,"
and for City Council candidates there must also be 200 contributions of at least $5 each
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programs that provide eligible candidates with matching grants
based on the number and value of small private contributions to
the candidate may also limit the public fund match to donations
from the same category of constituents, such as residents, whose
donations were necessary to qualify the candidate for public
funding. 17 6
Can a state or city favor its own voters or residents by
conditioning a candidate's eligibility for public funds on raising a
threshold number or amount of donations just from the
jurisdiction's voters or residents, and can it limit a matching
funds program to matching only donations from those
constituents? Almost certainly, the answer is "yes." In Buckley v.
Valeo, the Supreme Court upheld the federal program of
providing public funds to presidential candidates, finding that
the public financing of candidates advances three important
goals: reducing "the deleterious influence of large contributions
on our political process," "facilitat[ing] communication by
candidates with the electorate," and "free[ing] candidates from
the rigors of fundraising."177 The Court linked public funding to
democratic self-government, determining Congress "use[d]
public money to facilitate and enlarge public discussion and
participation in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-
governing people."1 78 The Court also upheld the provisions of the
presidential primary public funding program tying eligibility for
public funds to raising a threshold amount of private money in
smaller donations and then providing public funds on a
matching funds basis.179 As the Court noted, "Congress' interest
in not funding hopeless candidacies with large sums of public
money ... necessarily justifies the withholding of public
assistance from candidates without significant
public support."180
Buckley supports the position that a state or city may make
eligibility to participate in its public funding program contingent
on a showing "of significant public suppor' from the state or
from individuals residing in the council district for which election is sought, out of the
$25,000 total council candidates need to raise in qualifying contributions).
176 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.35(2)(b) (West 2014); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 3-
702(3); L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE § 49.7.27(A) (2013).
177 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 91.
17s Id. at 92-93.
179 Id. at 106-08.
'8 Id. at 96.
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local public. That conserves the use of scarce taxpayer dollars
and reserves public funds for those candidates who, because
they already have a track record of constituent support, are
more likely to be serious contenders. Although campaign
contributions have been treated as a form of speech and
association, the contributions that qualify a candidate for public
financing and determine how much public funds a candidate will
receive are formal steps to establish eligibility for and the extent
of support from a state- or city- created, -regulated and
-funded program. To that extent, qualifying and matchable
contributions closely resemble the petition signatures required
to place the name of a candidate or a proposition on the ballot.
Like ballot access petitions, a state or city "may legitimately
require 'some preliminary showing of a significant modicum of
support."' 181 As a state or city can make placement of a
candidate, a political party, or an initiative or referendum on its
ballot contingent on the signatures of an appropriate number of
state or local community members,1 82 it should be able to make
eligibility for a grant of state or local public funds similarly
contingent on constituent support.
To be sure, as the Courts decision in Arizona Free
Enterprise Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennettl83 demonstrates,
the provisions of a public funding program are subject to First
Amendment review. Arizona Free Enterprise determined that
providing a publicly-funded candidate with additional public
funds because of the high level of spending of a privately-funded
opponent or substantial independent spending against the
publicly-funded candidate operates to burden the speech of the
privately-funded candidate and independent committee.1 84 But
Arizona Free Enterprise is not relevant to state or local laws
conditioning public funding on constituent donations. Such laws
certainly do not burden the spending of privately-funded
candidates or independent groups; if anything, they benefit non-
participants in the public funding program by making it harder
1a1 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96 (citing and quoting Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442
(1971). Accord, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 718-19 (1974) (noting that petition
signature requirement is typical way of testing "seriousness" of candidacy).
182 See, e.g., Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); Lerman v.
Bd. Of Elections, 232 F.3d 135, 151 (2d Cir. 2000); Frami v. Ponto, 255 F. Supp. 2d 962,
968 (W.D. Wis. 2003).
183 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011).
184 Id. at 2818-19.
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for candidates to qualify. They do not burden potential non-
constituent contributors who remain free to contribute to non-
participating candidates, political parties, and independent
committees in the state, and even to the publicly-funded
candidate to the extent that the public funding program does not
fully finance the publicly-funded candidate's campaign. Even if
the candidate is fully publicly-funded or is required to accept a
spending cap which limits the candidate's ability to accept
additional donations, the non-constituent donor is no worse off
than in-constituency donors who are also so limited. The only
"burden," if there is one, on the would-be non-constituent donor
is that her donation will not qualify a candidate for public funds
or be matchable and so is to that extent worth less to the
candidate. That does not bar the would-be donor from giving to
the candidate and so does not actually limit the donor's First
Amendment rights of speech or association, although it may
make the candidate less eager to solicit that contribution or to
associate with the would-be donor.
Arguably a constituent qualifying contribution requirement
burdens those candidates who enjoy greater financial support
from outside the jurisdiction relative to those who enjoy broader
in-constituency financial support. That should operate as an
incentive to the candidate to increase in-constituency support.
But in any event that "burden" is no more than the flipside of
the state or local public interest in linking taxpayer campaign
subsidies to the fact and extent of constituent backing. The
modest First Amendment burden-if there is a burden at all-
on outside contributors and inside candidates dependent on
outside financial support is justified by the important
government interest in assuring sufficient constituent support
as a condition for access to scarce taxpayer dollars, much as
constituent support in the form of petition signatures may be
required as a condition for placing a candidate or voter initiative
on the ballot.
In short, despite the challenge to the accountability of
representatives to their constituents posed by significant non-
constituent campaign financing, there is not much a state, city,
or legislative district can do to curb the role of outside campaign
money provided by Americans. Outside money almost surely
cannot be barred or subject to aggregate dollar or percentage
caps. Outside money is just as protected by the First
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Amendment as constituent money and is unlikely to be seen as
posing a greater threat of quid pro quo corruption than
constituent contributions. Even if non-constituent contributions
distort the priorities or influence the policies that elected
representatives pursue or make them less attentive to the
concerns of their constituents, those are not arguments the
Supreme Court will credit as a basis for limiting contributions.
Public funding, however, can provide a means of buffering the
impact of non-constituent funding. By providing candidates with
a greater incentive to solicit financial support for constituents
and leveraging that support with additional matching funds,
public funding can increase the value of internal financial
support. Public funding has long been supported as a
constitutionally acceptable way of limiting the impacts of private
wealth on elections and of campaign contributions on
governance generally. As this discussion suggests, it can also be
a means of curbing the impact of outside money.
IV. CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND THE CONCEPT OF SELF-
GOVERNANCE
Our decades-long debate about campaign finance regulation
has been shaped by what might be called the democracy-free
speech divide. Since Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Courts
campaign finance doctrine has been largely framed by First
Amendment concerns. But much of campaign finance regulation
has been driven by the belief that campaign finance, like
elections, is part of the project of democratic self-government.
Although Bluman is not precisely a reform opinion, the framing
of campaign finance within election law is nicely captured by
Bluman's statement that "spending money to influence voters
and finance campaigns is ... closely related to democratic self-
government," as these "[p]olitical contributions and express-
advocacy expenditures are an integral aspect of the process by
which Americans elect officials to federal, state, and local
government."18 5 Campaign finance reformers have sought to
make campaign finance law more like the law of democratic
elections by making it more egalitarian. The expansion of the
franchise towards universal adult citizen suffrage, the
invalidation of poll taxes and wealth tests for voting and
185 Bluman v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288-89 (D.D.C. 2011).
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candidacy, and the adoption of the one person, one vote rule for
legislative apportionment reflect a commitment to providing all
members of the community with an equal opportunity to
participate in the electoral process and, to that extent, a
relatively equal opportunity to influence government decision-
making. Analogizing campaign money to voting, reformers
would extend the political equality norm at the heart of our
theory of democratic self-government to the financing of
campaigns by curbing the role of unequal private wealth in
fueling the campaign finance system. Doctrinally, the high
water marks of this vision of campaign finance as part of the law
of democratic self-government were the Courts decisions in
Austin in 1990 and McConnell v. Federal Election Commission186
in 2003. Austin sustained a state ban on corporate independent
spending because of concern about the impact on elections of
"the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of
wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form
and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for
the corporation's political ideas."1 8 7 McConnell rejected a
constitutional challenge to the Bipartisan Campaign Reform
Acts ban on soft money contributions, with the Court
determining the ban was justified by Congress's interest in
ending the preferential access soft-money donors enjoyed, and
the resulting improper influence they wielded on government
decision-making.188
However, over the last decade, since Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito joined the Court, campaign finance doctrine
has moved sharply away from the democratic self-government
framework and has, instead, doubled down on the First
Amendment perspective by emphasizing the speech and
associational dimensions of campaign finance. The Court has
overruled Austin, and its anti-distortion doctrine;189 repeatedly
rejected equality as a justification for campaign laws, including
not just those that limit spending but those that would "level the
playing field" up by providing assistance to those with less
access to campaign resources; 190 and repudiated McConnell's
186 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
187 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990).
18 McConnell, 540 U.S. 93, 142-71 (2003).
189 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 350-53 (2010).
190 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1450 (2014);
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determination that contribution-purchased access to lawmakers
and the resulting influence on government policy-making is a
form of corruption. 191 Indeed, the anti-reform bloc on the Court
has likened efforts to limit campaign money to government
censorship. 192 In the Courts current view, contributions and
spending-even if unequal-play a valued role in enabling
candidates, parties, and interest groups to communicate their
views to voters, who are free to decide how to cast their votes.
Contributions are also a means by which donors can associate
with candidates and other donors with similar views and
express their support to candidates. Only campaign
contributions that directly pose the danger of quid pro quo
corruption or its appearance may be limited.
What is startling about the Chief Justice's McCutcheon
peroration is that it attempts to go beyond the First Amendment
argument-that Shaun McCutcheon ought to be free to use his
money to express his views and associate with as many
candidates as he can afford-and to make the case for the right
to contribute to an unlimited number of candidates in terms of
the value of the responsiveness of government officials to donors.
This is an extraordinary move. It is one thing to say, as the
Court has been saying consistently since Citizens United, that
government responsiveness to big donors and independent
spenders is not a constitutionally sufficient basis for limiting
campaign money. It is something else again to say that elected
officials actually ought to be "cognizant of and responsive" to
their donors. 193 Like campaign finance reformers, the Chief
Justice appears to believe that how we finance our campaigns
affects the nature and quality of the representation that elected
officials provide. Unlike reformers, however, the Chief Justice
also appears to find that responsiveness to donors serves, rather
than distorts, the democratic representation elections are
supposed to promote.
The Chief Justice appears to assume, despite the facts of the
McCutcheon case, that contributors are constituents, so that
Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825-26 (2011);
Davis v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 554 U.S. 741 (2008).
'9' McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1450-51.
192 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354-55; Fed. Election Comm'n v. Wis. Right to Life,
Inc., 551 U.S. at 482.
193 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1462.
70 [ 2015
OF CONSTITUENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS
responsiveness to contributors is consistent with accountability
to constituents generally. I believe I have shown that this is
frequently not the case. Rather, constituents and contributors
are often very different people with different interests and
concerns who may want different things from government and
have different views about the policies government ought to
pursue. Indeed, not only does the Chief Justice's contention that
striking down the aggregate donation limits will promote
accountability to a representative's constituency fail to
persuade, but by validating the influence of contributors it
actually underscores exactly what many people find troubling
about the current campaign finance system.
The Chief Justice's rhetoric tries to bridge the divide
between the democratic self-governance and free speech visions
of campaign finance law by making the case against campaign
finance regulation in terms not only of free speech but also of the
accountability of representatives to the people. But reflection on
the constituency-contribution relationship to which his
statement calls attention actually demonstrates just how wide
that divide is. Contributors, not constituents, drive the
campaign finance system. Large donations make representatives
more attentive to their donors and potentially less responsive to
their actual constituents. This undermines the very
responsiveness to the people that the Chief Justice rightly
celebrates as the "key to the concept of self-governance."19
194 id.
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